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Information Technology and Firm Boundaries:
Evidence from Panel Data
Abstract
Previous literature has suggested that information technology (IT) can affect firm
boundaries by changing the costs of coordinating economic activity within and between
firms (internal and external coordination). This paper examines the empirical relationship
between IT and firm structure and evaluates whether this structure is consistent with prior
arguments about IT and coordination. We formulate an empirical model to relate the use
of information technology capital to vertical integration and diversification.  This model
is tested using an 8-year panel data set of information technology capital stock, firm
structure, and relevant control variables for 549 large firms.
Overall, increased use of IT is found to be associated with substantial decreases in
vertical integration and weak increases in diversification.  In addition, firms that are less
vertically integrated and more diversified have a higher demand for IT capital.  While we
cannot rule out all alternative explanations for these results, they are consistent with
previous theoretical arguments that both internal and external coordination costs are
reduced by IT.
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1. Introduction
Emerging technologies can often have a substantial impact on the design of organizations.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that the shift from small-scale handicraft production
methods to the mass-production oriented, international industrial enterprise was largely
driven by the appearance of three key coordination technologies: the steamship, the railroad,
and the telegraph.  These technologies eliminated the time and cost barriers of coordinating
activity over long distances, enabling large economies of scale to be realized.  Chandler
(1977) argues that these technology-driven changes were even more far reaching, leading to
a redefinition of the role of firm owners and the rise of professional management.
Some authors have argued that because information technology reduces the cost of
coordination within and between firms, the rapid price and quality improvement of IT may
enable a shift in the structure of organizations analogous to the Industrial Revolution
(Drucker, 1988;  Malone and Rockart, 1991).   An important manifestation of this
restructuring is the change in firm boundaries (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987;
Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991;  Clemons and Reddi, 1993).  Firms may expand or contract in
size while performing the same activities or may shift the types of production activities
performed.  For example, if IT makes it easier for firms to access the market for needed
materials, then firms may decrease vertical integration.   Similarly, if IT makes it possible to
coordinate diverse production activities inside the firm, companies may further diversify
into new product markets or increase vertical integration.
Previous work has provided some evidence that IT is associated with a change in firm
boundaries.  Case studies have linked coordination benefits arisng from IT use to decreased
vertical integration (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; Clemons, Reddi and Row, 1993)
and provided some evidence that the level of diversification has changed (Gurbaxani and
Whang, 1991).  A statistical study has also linked IT to decreased firm size, consistent with
coordination cost arguments, using data for six sectors of the economy (Brynjolfsson,
Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil, 1989; 1994).  No previous study, however, has combined
statistical analysis with micro-level data to obtain the generalizability of industry-level
studies with the precision of case studies.  Furthermore, previous statistical work could not
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distinguish the effects of IT on internal and external coordination.
The goal of this paper is to examine empirically the connection between information
technology and coordination-related changes in organizational form.   The analysis will be
focused on two related questions:
1) What are the empirical relationships between IT capital use and two measures of firm
structure: vertical integration and diversification?
2) Are the observed relationships between IT capital and firm structure consistent with
arguments about the effects of IT on coordination costs?
The first question will be addressed by constructing models for measuring the
interrelationships between IT and firm structure.  Ideally, to address the second question we
would like to perform correlations between IT capital and measures of coordination costs.
Because coordination costs can include a wide range of activities, are likely to be highly
setting specific, and are not captured in any known data source, we instead use evidence on
the relationship between computer capital and firm structure to infer a relationship between
IT and coordination costs.
More specifically, previous literature has suggested that IT leads to a reduction in both
internal and external coordination costs.  Some authors have also extended this argument to
suggest that the effect of IT on external coordination cost is greater than the effect of IT on
internal coordination cost.   For our empirical investigation, we relate these arguments to the
following testable hypotheses which we then explore using our data: a)  IT capital use
should be negatively related to vertical integration, and b) IT capital use should be
positively related to diversification.
In this paper, we first argue how the correlation between firm structure and IT capital can be
used to test the relationship between IT and coordination costs.  We then develop estimating
equations to evaluate these effects, rule out some alternative causes and distinguish two
causal directions, the effects of IT on firm structure and the effects of firm structure on the
demand for IT.  These equations are then estimated using a large, detailed panel data set for
549 firms over 8 years (1987-1994).
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Overall, we find evidence that suggests IT causes a decrease in vertical integration, and
weaker evidence that IT causes an increase in diversification.  Both firm-level IT capital
and industry-level IT capital influence firm structure in the same way when considered
separately, although the actual level of IT in the firm is a better predictor of firm structure
than the overall intensity of IT in the industries in which a firm participates.  That is, the
choices on IT use by individual firms appears to outweigh the general tendency of firms
in IT-intensive industries to have less vertical integration and more diversification.  In
addition, firms that are less vertically integrated and more diversified have a higher
demand for IT after controlling for other determinants of IT demand.  Finally, similar
results are found when the analysis is performed using changes in IT capital and changes
in firm structure.
These results provide support for our hypotheses and the predictions of earlier theory
papers.  Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) argued that IT leads to an overall decline in
coordination costs. Clemons and Row (1993) suggested that the effect of IT on external
coordination costs (which combines both coordination and transactions costs) is likely to
dominate the effects of IT on internal coordination costs.  This is the first analysis that
could distinguish these two arguments empirically and both are supported.
2.  Previous Research
In this section, we briefly review the previous theoretical and empirical work that is
relevant to the modeling and empirical analysis in this paper.   More comprehensive
discussions of the literature on IT and vertical integration appear in Clemons and Reddi
(1992) and Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1989, 1994).  A general
overview on IT and firm structure, which is used extensively in the discussion below,
appears in Gurbaxani and Whang (1991).
2.1  Prior Theoretical Work
Most analyses of IT and firm structure adopt a transactions cost perspective.  Some
papers from the IT community focus on the frictional costs of transacting such search and
communications costs (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987), while others emphasize
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issues of incentives and opportunism (Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Clemons, Reddi and
Row, 1993; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993).
To evaluate these previous arguments, suppose all costs of operations can be divided into
three categories: internal coordination costs, external coordination costs and production
costs.   Internal coordination costs represent expenses incurred for communications, data
transfer, and other actual expenditures on managing dependencies between activities
(Malone and Crowston, 1994).  In addition, internal coordination costs also include losses
from incentive misalignment such as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1974).
External coordination costs represent the actual costs of writing contracts, locating
suppliers and other costs of using market procurement, as well as the transaction costs
that arise because of possible opportunistic behavior by suppliers (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975).  Production costs are all expenses other than internal and external
coordination, and are generally believed to be lower for outside procurement because of
economies of scale or specialization.
The impact of IT on vertical integration is determined by the degree to which IT changes
the cost of internal coordination, external coordination, and production.  Malone, Yates
and Benjamin (1987) argue that, because market procurement is more coordination
intensive than producing intermediate products in-house, a reduction in both types of
coordination costs, relative to production costs, will generally favor external procurement
over vertical integration.  Clemons and Row (1993) argue that IT has a disproportionate
effect on the transactions cost component of external coordination, also favoring external
procurement.  Specifically, IT reduces transaction risks such as "shirking" and
"opportunistic renegotiation" through improved monitoring and a reduction of sunk
investments in coordination.  In general, a more vertically integrated firm can be viewed
as having "accepted" greater production costs and internal coordination costs in return for
lower external coordination costs.  Similarly, less vertically integrated firms economize
on production and internal coordination costs, but incur increased external coordination
costs (Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991).
A similar framework can be employed to evaluate the impact of IT on diversification.
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Diversification entails increased internal coordination costs because firms have to
manage more complex and diverse activities.  However, there should be little effect of
external coordination costs on diversification because, unlike the vertical integration
decision, if a firm chooses not to produce an unrelated product in-house, there is no need
to obtain the same product in the marketplace.  Under some circumstances diversification
may have productivity advantages to offset the increased internal coordination cost.
Montgomery (1994) argues that diversification can be valuable if it allows a firm to have
market power from size or multi-market contact with competitors or allows a firm to
leverage underutilized resources which cannot be sold in a competitive market (e.g.,
knowledge, firm-specific human capital or a specialized organizational structure).
 2.2  Prior Empirical Work
Several studies have examined these relationships using statistical approaches.
Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1989, 1994) examined the time series
relationship between average firm size and IT investment in six broad sectors of the U.S.
economy.  Overall, they found evidence that increased IT investment was associated with
decreasing firm size.  They argue that this is due to decreased vertical integration,
consistent with coordination cost arguments.   There have also been at least two papers on
the relationship between IT and firm structure at the firm level.  Brynjolfsson, Hitt and
Viswanathan (1995) found that IT intensity of the firm or of the economy as a whole
increased as firms focused on a narrow range of industries.  Dewan, Min and Michael
(1996) report that IT demand is higher for firms with more related diversification, but
found little impact of vertical integration or unrelated diversification in a cross-sectional
analysis.
2.3 Integration of Previous Theory
To summarize, previous authors have suggested that reductions in internal coordination
costs will allow firms to become larger, increasing vertical integration and
diversification.  Reductions in external coordination cost will favor decreased vertical
integration, but should have no effect on diversification.  Therefore, by observing the
effect of IT on vertical integration and diversification, we can evaluate whether or not
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this is consistent with IT having an effect on coordination cost.  More specifically, if we
observe that increased use of IT is associated with decreases in vertical integration and
increases in diversification, then this is consistent with our original hypothesis stated in
the introduction:  a)  IT lowers both types of coordination cost, and b) the effect of IT on
external coordination cost is greater than the effect of IT on internal coordination cost.
3.  Analytical Model and Empirical Implementation
3.1  Theoretical Concerns
Based on previous work, three alternative hypotheses can also be distinguished.  First, if
IT has no influence on internal coordination cost, but decreases external coordination
cost, there will be a negative relationship between IT and vertical integration and no
effect on diversification. This is consistent with previous work that had not considered
the role of coordination in affecting diversification (see e.g. Malone et. al., 1987, or
Clemons and Row, 1993).  Similarly, if IT has no influence on external coordination, but
decreases internal coordination cost, or if the internal coordination cost effects are greater
than the external coordination cost effects, both vertical integration and diversification
should increase with IT use.  This is the prediction that would be reached if IT had a
minimal effect on inter-firm communication.  Finally, if there are no effects of IT on
coordination, then we should see no relationship between IT and either vertical
integration or diversification.
There are several important characteristics of this analytical setting that are important for
empirical implementation.  First, there is the potential for multiple causal directions in the
relationship between IT and firm structure.  Both firm structure and technology use are
choice variables, whose costs and benefits are affected by exogeneous factors such as
technology prices and the value of vertical integration and diversification (apart from
coordination concerns).  If the price of IT drops, leading firms to obtain more IT, then
this will lower marginal coordination costs and enable firms to decrease vertical
integration and increase diversification.1  Similarly, if market forces dictate that a firm
                                               
1 This relies on the fact that IT is a general purpose technology which can easily be adapted to multiple
uses.  For example, vast improvements were made in the availability of management information as a by-
Information Technology and Firm Boundaries:  Evidence from Panel Data 7
needs to become less vertically integrated, then the firm will adopt more IT to support
external coordination.  This is in essence an argument that IT and firm structure are
complementary (in the sense used by Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994);  that is, an
increase in one dimension (e.g., IT capital use) will be associated with changes in other
complements (e.g., decreased vertical integration) and vice-versa in response to
exogenous drivers (e.g., IT price declines).  Because the different causal directions may
be of interest, we will attempt to separate them using empirical techniques.
Second, there may be other factors that might simultaneously lead a firm to change IT
and firm structure aside from coordination cost reasons.  Firms with skilled workers may
have an increased value of IT, and may also be more diversified to exploit their general
knowledge or human capital resources in multiple industries.  Alternatively, managers of
firms with highly skilled, well-paid workers may be less risk averse, leading a firm to
have less need to smooth cash flow through diversification.  Taken together, these
examples would lead to a correlation between IT and structure in an indeterminate
direction that could potentially offset any coordination effects.  To rule out these types of
factors, we also analyze the relationship between changes in structure and IT for the same
firm over time (a first difference specification).  This removes the effect of any factor that
could confound the results that is unique to a particular firm but constant over time.
3.2 Empirical Implementation
The simplest empirical test of our hypotheses is to calculate rank order correlations
between three observable variables:  IT capital (C), vertical integration (V),
diversification (D).  However, this approach has a limited ability to rule out other causes
of the results and cannot distinguish the two causal directions.2  An alternative is to
specify equations that relate the variables of interest in each causal direction and then use
instrumental variables estimation techniques to separate out the different causal effects. A
                                                                                                                                           
product of automation of financial and sales operations.  In more modern times, networked PCs on
workers’ desktops, acquired for various purposes, now make it possible to communicate extensively within
and between firms through electronic mail or access to the World-Wide Web.
2 The fact that IT, diversification, or vertical integration can be caused by other factors is not important for
this analysis unless these factors change IT and firm structure at the same time.  Otherwise, they just
introduce random variation in the regressions, increasing standard errors but leaving coefficients estimates
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general structure for these estimating equations is:
1a:  other determinants of V +
1b: D other determinants of D +
1c:  C = other determinants of C +
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where:  ε ε εc d v, ,  are i.i.d. error terms (which could be correlated)
The parameters µ µcd vd and  are proportional to effect of computer investment on
reductions in internal coordination costs and should be positive.  The parameters
µ µc
v
v
c and  are proportional to the how much more computers reduce external
coordination costs than internal coordination cost and should be negative.  Technically,
the exact test of the hypothesis stated in the introduction can be described as the joint test
µ µ µ µc
d
d
c
v
c
c
v> > < <0 0 0 0, , ,  against the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
However, since we always reject the null hypothesis in our analysis for this joint test, we
emphasize analysis of individual coefficients.  This allows inference about relative effects
and causal direction.
To define “other determinants” in equations (1a-1c), we adapt empirical specifications
that have been used previously where available.  While previous research has identified
some variables that may influence firm structure (see footnote 12), there is no common
theoretical model that has been employed to predict vertical integration or diversification.
Thus, little additional structure is placed on the vertical integration and diversification
equations from previous work.  However, for the IT equation (1c) we can use the theory
on estimating demand for factors of production.   In the factor demand framework (see
Berndt, 1992, Chapter 9), IT is a function of relative factor prices and output.  To
incorporate firm structure, we assume that firm structure choices affect the overall level
of IT, but do not change the responsiveness of demand to price.  We start with the
assumption of a transcendental logarithmic cost function, which is commonly applied in
empirical production research (Berndt, 1992).  Let ordinary capital be designated by K
(with price pk), ordinary labor designated by L (with price pl), and firm output by O.  In
                                                                                                                                           
unbiased.
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our case the cost function is (not yet incorporating firm structure):
2: log log log log log log log
, , , , , , , ,
  Cost p p p O p Oi i
i K L C i K L C
ji i j o
j K L C
io i
i K L C
= + + +
= = = =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑α α α α
 We then apply Shepard’s Lemma ( C Costpc
=
∂
∂
, see Varian, 1992, p. 210) and incorporate the
vertical integration and diversification terms to obtain the demand equation to be estimated:
3: log log log log  IT Cost Share p Cp C p K p L V D p p p O
c
it k l
c v
c
d
c
cc c cl l ck k co= + +
= + + + + + +α µ µ α α α α
While the equation is not linear in the IT capital term (C), it is linear in the ratio of
computer capital input to total costs, which include (current dollar) direct costs for labor
and capital costs for computers and ordinary capital to account for their durable nature.
This equation does not place any restrictions on which factors are substitutes or
complements.  In addition, it also requires no assumptions about economies of scale; for
example, it does not matter whether or not larger firms require less input factors (in total
or individually) per unit of output than smaller firms.
Measuring computers as a cost share also has another advantage for our purposes: it
provides a normalization for size that is motivated by economic theory.  Larger firms are
likely to use more IT and be larger in terms of the vertical integration and diversification
measures irrespective of any other relationship.  We therefore use IT cost share as the
measure of IT capital in pooled analyses to prevent the results from being obscured by
normal variations in IT use and firm structure due to variation in firm size.
4. Data and Variable Construction
There are three types of data that are used for this analysis: information technology
hardware spending provided by Computer Intelligence InfoCorp (CI), firm specific
financial information from Compustat, and measures of firm structure constructed from
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Computer Intelligence data.  In addition, as a validity check, we compare the CI data with
data from Trinet Corporation and Compustat (see Appendix B).   Each of these sources is
summarized below.
4.1  Information Technology and Financial Variables
CI Information Technology Measure.  Computer Intelligence InfoCorp conducts a series
of surveys that track specific pieces of computer equipment in use at approximately
25,000 sites; these sites represent different locations of firms in the Fortune 1000.  CI
conducts telephone surveys of information systems managers (site sampling frequency
ranges from monthly to annually, depending on size) to obtain detailed information on
each site’s information technology hardware.  Each piece of hardware is then market-
valued and aggregated to form an estimate of the value of hardware in use at the firm. We
have data for the Fortune 1000 annually for the period 1987 to 1994 although we restrict
the sample to firms which have 6 out of 8 years present to limit changes in the sample
over time, reducing the number of firms to 549.3
To gauge the quality of these data we checked it against similar data from
Computerworld (described in Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996) which include 1500
overlapping data points (1988-1993) with the CI dataset.   The computer capital figures
show high correlations (>75%) between the two sources, which provides some indication
of accuracy, particularly given different collection methodologies between the sources. In
addition, the computer capital data from CI shows a high correlation (75-80%) with
broader measures of IT such as IS labor expense and a composite measure (“IT stock”),
that includes both capital and labor (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996).  Thus, we can use the
                                               
3 The firms that are included in the analysis are somewhat larger on average than the potential population
of all firms that appeared on the CI database over 8 years, although much of this difference is probably a
result of small firms dropping out of the relevant population over time.  However, there are no differences
on measured IT cost share between the firms in and out of the sample in 1994, and no economically
significant differences between the firm structure measures for the restricted sample we use and the full
sample of firms with complete data.  Furthermore, the correlation structure between firm structure
measures and IT is similar whether or not we restrict the sample.  Altogether, this suggests that there does
not appear to be any sample selection bias as a result of using a near-balanced panel or from deviations
from the population (Fortune 1000 firms).
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CI computer capital stock measure as a good indicator of overall firm IT.4  While we
cannot rule out the existence of measurement error, we have some comfort that these data
are consistent with other sources.
Compustat Financial Information.   The firms on the CI dataset were matched to
Standard & Poor's Compustat II database to obtain information on labor expenses, capital
stock, and employment.5 These data were supplemented with price deflators from a
variety of sources to construct measures of the sample firms’ inputs and output using
standard procedures (Hall, 1990; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996).  See Appendix B for
variable construction, including detail on the calculation of input quantities and rental
prices needed for the IT cost share measure.
4.2  Firm Structure Measures
The unique data for this analysis come from several databases that track firms'
participation in different industries.  As part of its surveying process, CI also collects data
on the primary industry for every site that they survey for IT data.  The core of the data is
developed from Dun and Bradstreet’s database of firm locations and is updated during
CI’s interview process.   For each site, CI collects or verifies a 4-digit SIC6 code, number
of employees and approximate sales, although for the early years (1987-1988) only size
buckets (e.g. 1-5, 5-20…) rather than actual numbers are reported.
The advantage of these data is that they have a nearly complete panel over the 8 years,
although there is likely to be some error in the data due to variation in site sampling and
random respondent error.  To be satisfied with the validity of these data, we compare
summary statistics and firm structure measures between CI and other data sources with
comparable measures and find high levels of correlation (see Appendix B), with
                                               
4 Correlational results between IT and firm structure are similar when Computerworld IT data are used.
5 Standard & Poor's Compustat data have been widely used to estimate firm-level production functions for
capital, labor, and other inputs.  For instance, the underlying data for "The Manufacturing Sector Master
File:  1959-1987" maintained at the National Bureau of Economic Research by Hall (1990) are drawn from
Compustat.
6 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) coding system is a way of assigning firms to industries.
Four digit codes represent detailed industry classifications (e.g. meat packing), while 2-digit codes
represent broader industries (e.g. food manufacturing).
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correlation coefficients on the order of 0.6 to 0.8 across measures and data sources.  We
also corroborate our results using different data sources and find that the correlation
between IT and firm structure is broadly similar (results not shown).  Again, this suggests
that errors in data are not corrupting the results.
Using the CI data, we are able to construct three measures of diversification that have
been used in prior research to capture different aspects of diversification: the Concentric
index which measures “relatedness” of industries (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988;
Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), a Herfindahl index of industry shares which
measures industry dispersion, and counts of SIC codes (Lichtenberg, 1990) which
measures general industry participation.
One shortcoming common to all of these diversification measures is that they confound
vertical integration and diversification.  For example, a firm may have 20% of its
employees in a steel mill and 80% in an automobile manufacturing plant.  Even though
this is indicative of vertical integration since steel is a major input factor in the
production of automobiles, the firm would be measured as diversified by two of the three
measures (SIC count=2, Herfindahl = .16, concentric =0).  To control for this effect, we
remove the variance in the diversification measure shared by vertical integration, leaving
a residual that captures diversification uniquely.7
For vertical integration, we employ the vertical industry connection index (VIC)
developed by Maddigan (1981).  This measure represents the strength of input-output
dependencies between the industries in which a firm participates, using the aggregate
input-output (IO) tables for the U.S. economy  (Lawson and Teske, 1994).  A firm that
participates in industries that have strong make-buy relationships according to
commodity flows in the IO table (e.g., automobile manufacturing and steel) will have a
high value of this index.  Alternatively, a firm that participates in industries that little or
no make-buy relationships (e.g. automobile manufacturing and insurance) will have
lower values of this index.  While this measure does not incorporate industry shares, it
                                               
7We first run a regression of the diversification measure on vertical integration and use the residuals as a
measure of “true” diversification.
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has the advantages that it is motivated by economic theory instead of being ad hoc, it
requires no subjective judgment, and it captures vertical integration uniquely.
 4.3 Control Variables
In addition to the base variables described previously, several control variables are
included in the regressions to correct for possible data error and provide additional
insight into the relationships of interest.  First, because CI is a site level census for each
firm and the number of sites sampled varies over time, it is possible that error is induced
in the IT measures as a result of variation in the CI sampling.  To eliminate the variation
in measured IT that is solely due to variation in site sampling, we add a variable (SITES)
which counts the number of sites the firm reports on CI for that year.8  Unfortunately,
because some variation in SITES is driven by true changes in firm structure, controlling
for SITES also removes some of the true variance of the other measures.  Because this
potentially leads to underestimates of the impact of IT on structure (and vice-versa), we
perform some analyses without this control.
Second, while we are primarily interested in the firm-level effects of IT on structure, it
may also be useful to consider the effect of industry IT on firm structure since this ties to
previous empirical work.  In addition, some of the firm-level variation in IT is due to
choices of industry participation.  Because some industries are more IT intensive than
others, these industry affects may obscure the variation in chosen IT investment with
variation due to the pattern of industry participation.  To reduce this problem, a variable
is included that measures the IT a firm would have if it were at the industry average for
each 2-digit SIC industry in which the firm participates.  This is calculated by
multiplying the share of the firm in each industry in which it participates by the average
IT/Output ratio for that industry as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
summing over all industries for that firm. Thus, by including this variable we can isolate
the effects of industry IT and IT investment unique to each firm.
                                               
8 This variable removes the variance in measured IT and firm structure due to variation in site sampling
preventing a spurious correlation between IT (increasing as more sites are sampled) and the number of
industries the in which a firm participates (also increasing with the number of sites sampled).
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5. Results
In this section we perform statistical analysis of our basic testable hypothesis that IT
should be negatively related to vertical integration and positively related to
diversification.  We begin by reporting data characteristics. We then formulate estimation
equations based on the structure shown in equations 1a-1c and perform instrumental
variables estimation (specifically, two-stage least squares) to yield parameter estimates
for each causal direction between IT and firm structure.  Finally, we estimate a first
difference model that relates changes in IT to changes in firm boundaries to rule out
potential confounding effects.
5.1  Sample Characteristics
The average firm in the sample is very large, with value added of about $1 billion and
employment of approximately 16,000 in 1990.   Not surprisingly, these firms are both
highly diversified and vertically integrated. The average firm participated in 15 4-digit
SIC industries and 8 2-digit SIC industries, although the level of industry participation is
much larger for manufacturing firms (an average of 18 4-digit SIC industries) than for
service firms (averaging 9 4-digit SICs).   There is also a substantial difference in the
vertical industry connection index between manufacturing and services (0.25 vs. 0.07),
although the magnitude does not have an easy interpretation.9  All measures have high
variance, suggesting substantial variation across firms (see Table 1).
Interestingly, over the sample period, there has been little change in average
diversification, vertical integration or firm size (as measured by employment) for the
sample of firms, although the average may mask substantial differences among firms.  IT
cost share is relatively stable over time since it represents the proportion of IT in total
cost in current dollar terms.  This would imply increases of 20-30% per year in constant
dollar IT stock which is consistent with press reports of dramatically increasing IT
investment.
                                               
9 The VIC is bounded below by zero (single industry or no vertical linkages) and above by one, although
the upper bound would not be attainable in our sample given the structure of the I-O matrix.  See Maddigan
(1981) for more discussion of the properties of this index.
Information Technology and Firm Boundaries:  Evidence from Panel Data 15
5.2 Estimating Equations
We estimate equations using the structure for the model described earlier and the two
additional variables (Industry IT, Sites) described in the data section.  This yields our
final estimating equations:
4a:   +  +
4b:   +
4c:   = +
                    +   
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IIT
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To isolate each causal direction as well as control for some types of confounding effects
we employ two-stage least squares (2SLS) for each equation.   For instruments for IT we
use factor prices for computers, capital and labor.  We also employ an additional
instrument set that applies to general production factor inputs proposed by Bartelsman,
Caballero and Lyons (1994): the level of defense expenditures, the BAA bond yield, the
ratio of the price of oil to the price of durable goods, and ratio of the price of oil to the
price of non-durable goods.  The instruments are all prices or other factors that are
determined outside the firm and thus can be considered exogenous. For firm structure, we
use an instrument set suggested by Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) for their analysis
of the productivity impact of diversification.  The instruments are a set of dummy
variables for each 2-digit SIC industry that take the value 1 if the firm participates in that
2-digit industry at all, and zero otherwise.
5.3  Results
Tables 2a-2c contain 2SLS estimates10 of all three equations using one of our three
measures of diversification (SIC count, Herfindahl, concentric).  To show the relative
magnitude of the various effects, standardized coefficients are reported.  Estimates of the
first equation (identical for all diversification measures) suggest that increased firm-level
IT and increased industry level IT cause a decline in vertical integration.  A one standard
                                               
10 Across all equations and measures, a Hausman specification test rejects the ordinary least squares
formulation of the model in favor of two-stage least squares.  Three stage least squares estimates could not
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deviation increase in firm-level IT is associated with a 0.74 standard deviation decline in
vertical integration.  The industry-IT coefficient is positive when included with firm-level
IT, but changes to -0.14 when firm-level IT is omitted, suggesting that the majority of the
effect is at the firm level.
The estimates of the diversification equation are more equivocal (Table 2b).  The 4-digit
SIC and concentric measures of diversification are both positive and significant, while
the Herfindahl is only positive.  The effect of industry IT is small, and only barely
significant in the concentric equation.  As before, the industry IT coefficients rise and are
all positive when firm-IT is not included.  However, while this collection of results is
consistent with the prediction that IT should have a positive influence on diversification,
the small explained variance in these regressions suggests caution in interpretation.
 The final equation (Table 2c) measures the effect of firm structure on the demand for IT.
Firms that are less vertically integrated and more diversified use more IT.  The price
terms suggest that, at the sample mean, computers and capital are price complements,
while computers and labor are price substitutes.  In other words, as the price of computers
declines relative to the prices of capital and labor, firms (on average) will use more
ordinary capital and less labor. The coefficient on output suggests there are weakly
increasing returns to scale in IT.  As a firm grows in output, holding industry
participation constant, it requires slightly less IT per unit of total cost.   The effect of
vertical integration is somewhat smaller than found in the earlier regression (standardized
coefficient 0.22-0.24), while the effect of diversification is in the 0.05 to 0.10 range.11
Interestingly, there do not appear to be clear economic differences in the relationship of
IT to the various conceptions of diversification.  Both the most general measure of
diversification (4-digit SICs) as well as the measure that most directly captures firm
"focus" (Concentric) appear to have approximately the same effect, while a measure
                                                                                                                                           
be performed because the available instruments are not believed to be exogenous for all equations.
11 Because the vertical integration and most of the diversification scales are indices rather than simple
counts of an observable characteristic, it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of the effects beyond
standardized coefficients.  However, the interpretation is clear for the count of 4-digit SIC codes.  A firm
with double the mean IT spending would participate in approximately 5 more 4-digit SICs diversification
"demand" equation.  The effect of diversification on IT demand is somewhat smaller -- for the firm to
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which is in between these two shows the weakest effect.  As such, it is difficult to make a
statement stronger than a general concept of diversification and IT are positively related.
Our analysis has little to say about whether firms are diversifying in particular ways (e.g.,
related versus unrelated), given the pattern of these results.
Overall, this provides substantial support for previous arguments.  There is a strong and
consistent relationship between IT and reduced vertical integration and a weaker but still
substantial relationship between IT and diversification, at least in the causal direction
between firm structure and IT demand.  Joint tests that all effects are simultaneously zero
are strongly rejected (p<.001) irrespective of which diversification measure is used in the
analysis.
5.3 Controlling for differences among firms
All of the results thus far have not distinguished between effects that occur across firms
and those that occur as the same firm adopts more (or less) IT over time.  There are
several reasons why it may be advantageous to focus on time-series variation for a given
firm.  First, previous theoretical arguments may be closer to predicting a time-series
effect than a cross-sectional effect.  The original argument in Malone, Yates and
Benjamin (1987) was not about cross sectional variation, but changes in the cost of IT
over time enabling a shift toward more coordination intensive structures.  Second, while
the instrumental variables estimates reduce the possibility of spurious correlation, this
method relies on untestable assumptions about the instrumental variables. An alternative
assumption is that most of these external confounding factors are unique to individual
firms, such as staff quality, management risk seeking tendency or specialized knowledge.
To remove these effects, we estimate the relationship between year to year changes in the
variables for a given firm.
The IT cost share term already accounts for changes over time due to price changes in IT.
As such, it removes most of the time-series variation in this measure.  Since IT cost share
was used primarily to control for firm size and heterogeneity in input composition, a
suitable alternative for this analysis is to use the change in the logarithm of IT capital
                                                                                                                                           
increase IT spending by 10%, the organization would have to be in 10 additional SIC codes.
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(which is effectively the percent change in the level of IT capital).  We use this measure
and the previous instrument set with all instruments in first differences except for the
dummy variable instruments for firm structure.
Two-stage least squares estimates of the equations in first differences are shown in
Tables 3a and 3b.  The results suggest a strong negative relationship between IT and firm
structure in both causal directions.   IT appears to have a positive effect on
diversification, although the results are mixed in the demand equations.  However, the
industry-level IT measure has a positive relationship to IT demand, which is consistent
with our arguments.  In particular, if industry IT is measured with less error than firm-
level IT (which is likely due to aggregation), then it may show a stronger effect in first
difference regressions, since differencing increases the impact of random measurement
error.  Nonetheless, we can reject the hypotheses that there are no effects between IT and
firm structure at (p<.001), and can also reject the joint hypothesis that IT has no effect on
diversification at p<.10 or better in all regressions.  The fact that these hypothesis tests
are still consistent with other results even in first differences with instrumental variables
is striking since this formulation places the strongest demands on the data.12
5.4 Empirical Analysis Summary
Altogether, the results show a consistent negative relationship between vertical
integration and IT that is approximately the same magnitude in both causal directions.
Firms that are more vertically integrated have less IT and are in industries where the IT
intensity is lower.  The firm-level effect is somewhere between two and four times as
                                               
12 We also performed the analysis including additional control variables in the equations that have been
used in prior research on firm structure.  For vertical integration, we included capital intensity, debt-equity
ratio and industry growth.  In the diversification equation, we included firm average market share, industry
growth and debt-equity ratio.  All of these variables were also included in the IT demand equation.
Growth is likely to be a determinant of firm structure, since firms may use diversification to improve
growth rates.  Debt-equity ratio may influence structure since firms with high debt may diversify to smooth
cash flow.  Market share is a measure of market power;  firms may seek to diversifiy when they can exploit
market power in their respective product markets.  Finally, capital intensity may influence vertical
integration since high sunk capital investments may encourage opportunism;  thus, firms with capital
intensive production processes will tend to control more of the production process in their value chain.  The
basic conclusions are the same when these control variables are included, and the controls generally have
the predicted sign suggesting further robustness of our results.
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strong as the industry effect.13  Similarly, IT appears to support diversification: firms that
are more diversified tend to use more IT.  However, we find only marginal support for
the idea that increased IT leads to greater diversification. These results are similar in
pooled cross section and time series analysis, and appear to be consistent across
diversification measures.
Our results are consistent with prior coordination cost arguments: IT is associated with
both a decline in vertical integration and a (possibly weak) increase in diversification.
We are also able to rule out many of the alternative hypotheses about the relationship
between IT and coordination.   First, we convincingly reject the null hypothesis that IT on
coordination has no effect in all specifications.  We can also rule out the alternative
hypothesis that IT has no effect on external coordination.  In most specifications, we also
have some evidence that allows us to reject the alternative that IT has no effect on
internal coordination.
Unfortunately, we cannot eliminate the possibility that some unmeasured external factor
other than coordination effects is driving these results.  However, by performing the
analysis in differences as well as levels, using instrumental variables, and applying
models motivated by previous work as closely as possible, we substantially reduce the
possibility of spurious correlation.
 6.  Discussion
6.1  Contribution
Previous work has suggested that the effect of IT on coordination should lead to a change
in firm boundaries.  We use these arguments to motivate a test of the relationship
between IT and firm boundaries and use the results of this test to make inferences about
the effect of IT on coordination costs.  Our results suggest a strong negative relationship
between IT and vertical integration and a weaker positive relationship between IT and
diversification.   This supports the hypothesis that IT is associated with decreases in
                                               
13 The lower bound assumes that all the common variance these measures share with vertical integration is
due to industry effects, while the upper bound holds if all the common effect is attributed to the firm-level.
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internal and external coordination costs, and that the effect of IT on external coordination
costs is stronger and more consistent.  This also provides evidence supporting previous
theoretical analyses linking IT to changes in firm boundaries, and indicates the utility of
the coordination cost approach for evaluating the effect of IT on large-scale
organizational structure.
The results are also consistent with the previous work by Brynjolfsson et. al. (1989,
1994) who found that IT and firm size are negatively related at the industry level. Our
analyses also show a strong negative effect between industry IT and vertical integration,
consistent with their arguments, although the firm-level effect is much stronger. In
addition, we link IT specifically to vertical integration which could only be inferred in
their analysis by changes in firm size, examine two causal directions for the relationship,
extend the analysis to include diversification, and examine much more detailed data
which improves the precision of the estimates, and eliminate some problems of using
industry data that could affect the results, such as changes in industry composition over
time or differences among firms.
These results imply that the economy is beginning the transition from an era of the large,
vertically integrated enterprise, to organizational forms that draw on the resources of
small, independent, specialist suppliers, as has been suggested by previous authors.  In
many high technology (and high IT) industries this trend is already apparent; in Boston
(MA), Rochester (NY), and Silicon Valley, there are extensive networks of small
suppliers that have been created by departing employees or spun-off from large,
dominant technology firms.  Similar structures have been described in the automotive and
apparel industries (Peters, 1992).  However, these results suggest that the transition is
more broad-based, occurring at high-IT firms irrespective of their industries.  This change
also has implications for firm performance; as supplier networks become more
developed, large integrated firms will be at an increasing cost disadvantage, which should
lead to an increased rate of restructuring or an extended period of poor performance.
This is consistent with recent announcements that General Motors is spinning off AC
Delco (its parts subsidiary);  as stated by one industry analyst “what was once the greatest
source of strength at General Motors – its strategy of making parts in house – has become
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its greatest weakness”  (Schnapp, 1998).  Announcements by Ford of the operating
results of their internal parts supplier might suggest a similar move in the near future.
While it is not clear that technology adoption has caused firms to diversify more broadly,
firms that utilize coordination intensive structures tend to use substantially more IT.  This
would suggest that IT use is not simply driven by firm size, which would be true if scale
were a major determinant of adoption cost, but by the demand for coordination activity.
These results leave two important questions unanswered.  First, we have not addressed
the question of whether "alternative" organizational structures lead to higher firm
performance.  Correlational results suggest that firms are attempting to match IT
investment to organizational structure, although this may be due to institutional (such as
mimicry) as well as economic factors.  While industry anecdotes suggest performance is
a major factor in recent restructurings, large sample performance comparisons may help
distinguish economic optimization from other motivations held by managers who are
restructuring their firms.  Second, while we observe that large firms are becoming less
vertically integrated, we do not know what types of arrangements are appearing to
provide the services previously performed in-house.  These services could be performed
by arms-length supply contracts, partnerships or even "virtual corporations";  each has
different implications for the way in which inter-firm relationships need to be managed
and supported through technology.
 6.2 Limitations and Qualifications
These types of large sample results should always be interpreted carefully.  While we
attempted to control for external factors that could lead to spurious correlation by
including control variables for potential data problems and employing differencing or
instrumental variables estimates, there is always the possibility for unmodeled data error
or external factors that could bias the results. Since we cross-checked the analysis using
multiple data sources and different estimating equations, the likelihood of these problems
has been reduced.  The robustness of the vertical integration results across analyses gives
us fairly strong confidence in these results, although the diversification results are
potentially more suspect.  It may be that the effect of IT on internal coordination is
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weaker, that measurement error is influencing the results, or that the coordination cost
framework needs to be extended to consider other factors.
6.3  Long Term Implications
Overall, the analysis suggests that as computing becomes more prevalent in
organizations, firms are increasingly adopting coordination intensive structures.  The key
technological factor that is driving this trend, the decline in computing costs, is likely to
continue at least for the next ten years, and may even accelerate as internet and intranet
technology enables greater level of inter- and intra-organizational coordination.  While
this should continue to lead to further levels of outsourcing and potentially the rise of a
large number of specialist suppliers or even network corporations, the part of this
transition related to coordination may have limits.  As coordination becomes essentially
"free", it will become a less important factor in determining firm boundaries (assuming
that there are decreasing returns to increasing investment in coordination).  Other aspects
of computer enabled transformation of organizations, such as the rise of knowledge as a
key corporate asset and the demands of organizing and providing incentives to
knowledge workers, will become increasingly important determinants of firm boundaries.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Measure Mean
Standard
Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Diversification:  4-Digit SICs 14.6 11.0 11 3 100
Diversification:  Herfindahl 0.608 0.239 0.333 0.0327 1.00
Diversification: Concentric 0.978 0.477 1.03 0.000330 1.85
Vertical Industry Connection 0.180 0.234 0.0657 0 0.973
IT Cost Share 0.717% 0.795% 0.447% 0.0068% 9.29%
All measures computed from CI data (N=4155).
Table 2a.  Relationship between vertical integration and IT cost share (2SLS Estimates)
Vertical
Integration
Vertical
Integration
IT Cost Share -0.742***
(0.0569)
Industry IT 0.101***
(0.0249)
-.143**
(0.0142)
Sites .387***
(0.0166)
.381***
(0.0142)
R2* 20.9% 16.3%
* - R2 expressed in terms of original variables (not after first stage projection) to be
comparable across columns
N=4155;  (Key:  *** - p<.001, ** - p<.01, * - p<.05);  Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 2b.  Relationship between diversification and IT cost share (2SLS Estimates)
Diversification as
4-digit SIC Count
Diversification as
Herfindahl
Diversification as
Concentric
IT Cost Share 0.448***
(0.0484)
0.0941
(0.0533)
0.235***
(.0548)
Industry IT -0.0382
(0.0202)
0.0412
(0.234)
-0.0529*
(0.0241)
Sites 0.546***
(0.0141)
0.125***
(0.0156)
0.0843***
(0.0160)
R2 28.9% 2.1% 1.2%
N=4155;  (Key:  *** - p<.001, ** - p<.01, * - p<.05);  Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 2c.  IT demand equation (2SLS Estimates)
IT Cost Share IT Cost Share IT Cost Share
Diversification as 4-digit
SIC Count
0.0872***
(0.0242)
Diversification as
Herfindahl
0.0359
(0.0296)
Diversification as
Concentric
0.0904***
(0.0266)
Vertical Integration -0.218***
(0.0191)
-0.231***
(0.0192)
-0.242***
(0.0195)
Industry IT 0.281***
(0.0151)
0.287***
(0.0152)
0.284***
(0.0151)
Sites 0.0979***
(0.0222)
0.0139***
(0.0186)
0.141***
(0.0184)
log(IT Price) -0.0173
(0.0213)
-0.0119
(0.0214)
-0.00887
(0.0215)
log(Labor Price) 0.0292
(0.0150)
0.0325*
(0.0152)
0.0398***
(0.0154)
log(Capital Price) -0.0784***
(0.0213)
-0.0752***
(0.0214)
-0.0734***
(0.0214)
log(Value-Added) -0.0761***
(0.0173)
-0.0609***
(0.0171)
-0.0627***
R2 14.5% 14.2% 14.3%
N=4155;  (Key:  *** - p<.001, ** - p<.01, * - p<.05);  Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 3a: First Difference Analysis:  IT effects on firm structure (2SLS Estimates)
∆Vertical
Integration
∆Divers. as 4-
digit SIC
Count
∆Divers. as
Herfindahl
∆Divers. as 4-
Concentric
∆IT Capital -0.148***
(0.0274)
0.0163
(0.0260)
0.0934***
(0.0285)
0.0469***
(0.0287)
∆Industry IT -0.0794***
(0.0159)
0.0975***
(0.0151)
0.0235***
(0.0166)
-0.0421*
(0.0167)
∆Sites 0.314***
(0.0171)
0.412***
(0.0151)
0.0967***
(0.0178)
0.0626***
(0.0179)
R2 9.4% 18.2% 1.7% 0.8%
N=3564;  (Key:  *** - p<.001, ** - p<.01, * - p<.05);  Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 3b: First Difference Analysis:  IT Demand (2SLS Estimates)
Change in IT Change in IT Change in IT
Diversification as 4-digit
SIC Count
-0.0441
(0.0750)
Diversification as
Herfindahl
-0.0434
(0.0770)
Diversification as
Concentric
0.0917
(0.0814)
Vertical Integration -0.276***
(0.0659)
-0.246***
(0.0513)
-0.264***
(0.0527)
Industry IT 0.0674***
(0.0134)
0.0667***
(0.0131)
0.0659***
(0.0128)
Sites 0.128***
(0.0430)
0.108***
(0.0198)
0.0106***
(0.0197)
Other Variables K, L, IT Price
Change, Change in
Output
K, L, IT Price
Change, Change in
Output
K, L, IT Price
Change, Change in
Output
R2 14.5% 55.3% 55.1%
N=3564;  (Key:  *** - p<.001, ** - p<.01, * - p<.05);  Standard errors in parenthesis
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Appendix B: Variable Construction (not otherwise described in the text)
Ordinary Capital.  This figure was computed from total book value of capital
(equipment, structures and all other capital) following the method in Hall (1990).  Gross
book value of capital stock [Compustat Item #7 - Property, Plant and Equipment (Total -
Gross)] was deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator for fixed investment.  The
deflator was applied at the calculated average age of the capital stock, based on the three-
year average of the ratio of total accumulated depreciation [calculated from Compustat
item #8 - Property, Plant & Equipment (Total - Net)] to current depreciation [Compustat
item #14 - Depreciation and Amortization].  The calculation of average age differs
slightly from the method in Hall (1990), who made a further adjustment for current
depreciation.  The constant dollar value of computer capital  was subtracted from this
result.  Thus, the sum of ordinary capital and computer capital equals total capital stock.
Computer Capital (CI).  Total market value of all equipment tracked by CI for the firm
at all sites.  Market valuation is performed by a proprietary algorithm developed by CI
that takes into account current true rental prices and machine configurations in
determining an estimate.
This total is deflated by the deflator for computer systems of -19.4% per year developed
by Robert Gordon (1990).  The time trend Gordon found in prices through 1984 is
assumed to continue through 1994.
Labor Expense.  Labor expense was either taken directly from Compustat (Item #42 -
Labor and related expenses) or calculated as a sector average labor cost per employee
multiplied by total employees (Compustat Item #29 - Employees), and deflated by the
price index for Total Compensation (Council of Economic Advisors, 1992).
The average sector labor cost is computed using annual sector-level wage data (salary
plus benefits) from the BLS from 1987 to 1994.  We assume a 2040-hour work year to
arrive at an annual salary.  For comparability, if the labor figure on Compustat is reported
as being without benefits (Labor expense footnote), we multiply actual labor costs by the
ratio of total compensation to salary.
Rental Prices. Rental prices for ordinary capital inputs were computed using the
Jorgensonian cost of capital formula, assuming an annual real rate of return of 9%, 4%
expected inflation, and depreciation rates provided by the BLS for 2-digit industries over
time.  For computers, we use the same required rate of return but assume a 10%
depreciation rate and a -20% capital gains term, reflecting the regularity in price declines
of computers (Moore’s law).   After accounting for taxes, this results in a constant annual
rental price of 42% for computers and an average rental price of 13.5% for ordinary
capital.  See Christensen and Jorgensen (1969) for the general theory of rental prices, and
Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995) for typical estimates of the parameters not described above.
The price for current capital is the economy-level deflator for fixed investment.
Labor Price.  The price of labor is defined as total labor expense divided by total
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employment adjusted by the price index for Total Compensation by the BLS.  This
variable varies by firm.
Computer Price.  The aggregate computer deflator provided by the BEA is used for the
computer price.
Diversification Measures.
Definitions.  The SIC count measure is simply the count of different 4-digit SIC codes
that the firm participates in.  The Concentric Index is defined as follows:
Concentric W
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i j ij
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= =
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1 1
α α  
where: i,j = 1... N where N is the number of 4-digit industries a firm participates in
αi is the share of industry i in the firms’ total employment
Wij is a weighting function:
0 if the industries share the same 3-digit SICs
1 if the industries have different 3-digit SICs but the same 2-digit SIC
2 if the industries have different 2-digit SICs
Using the same notation the Herfindahl index is defined as follows.
Herfindahl i
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N
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Validation.  To examine the properties of these indices, we calculate the correlation
between data sources for these measures.  For 1987 we have a dataset from Trinet
Corporation that tabulates percentage of the firm in each industry (an earlier year of these
data were used by Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988).  The second source is Compustat
which has two measures.  The first are segments data, which includes information (SIC
code, and sometimes sales and assets) on up to 10 business segments of a firm.  In table
C1 we report correlations between diversification measures computed from each source.
Table C1: Correlations between CI measures and other sources
Comparison Concentric Herfindahl
# 4-digit
SICs
Trinet vs. CI  (1987) .61 .59 .85
Segments  vs. CI (1988-94) .47 .51 .53
Compustat  - CI (1994) x x .71
Altogether, this suggests that the SIC count measures are fairly consistent across data
sets, except for segments which are limited to 10 different SICs.  The Concentric and
Herfindahl are also directionally consistent although this calculation suggests that the
employment share data have some substantial component of random error.  However, it
should be noted that Trinet excludes most locations that are outside of SIC 20 to SIC 50,
so it can only be an incomplete characterization of firms.  This may account for some of
the variance.  Similarly, the employment share data for Compustat Segments data are
highly incomplete, also potentially contributing to a reduced correlation.
